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Israeli emigration policies in the Gaza Strip: crafting demography and forming control in the aftermath of the 1967 War

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In recent years Israeli archives have opened a large number of government and military records from the early years of the occupation regime in the Gaza Strip following the 1967 War.¹ Without archival sources, critical works previously analyzed the early Israeli policies in the Gaza Strip by relying on official publications, interviews, memoirs, and statistical surveys,² a scope that is now expanding with the new resources available. The first archive-based studies demonstrated how Israel attempted not only to rule the Strip, but to use its power to eliminate the Palestinian refugee problem. Tom Segev revealed the ambitions of Israeli leaders to encourage emigration of refugees – a fact well concealed by Israeli security forces for many decades.³ A study by Fatima Abreek-Zubiedat and Alona Nitzan-Shiftan illustrated how Israeli officials hoped to merge refugee camps with their urban surroundings, aiming to erase the national Palestinian ethos of the ‘right of return’.⁴ The most comprehensive archive-based study at the moment on Israeli rule over the Palestinians in the aftermath of the 1967 War is *The Bride and the Dowry* by Avi Raz, published in 2012. Nonetheless, Raz’s work concentrates on the West Bank and it only briefly mentions the existence of emigration policies in Gaza, based on a small number of archival documents that the author uncovered.⁵ Further research on the roots of Israeli control over the Gaza Strip could lift the curtain on Israeli intentions and policy planning behind closed doors, and shed new light on how history unfolded for the Strip and its Palestinian people.

This article uses recently declassified sources to examine and analyze Israeli emigration policies in the Gaza Strip in the aftermath of the 1967 War, showing how Israel crafted policies in the Strip to reduce the size of its population, and how, in a two-year process, it reformed its policies to meet the needs of a long-standing occupation. As we shall see, underlying these policies was the Israeli aspiration to annex the Gaza Strip without absorbing a large number of Arabs along with it, and especially not the 1948 refugees. To reconcile territorial goals with demographic concerns, the government embraced the concepts of population transfer, resettlement, and ‘encouraged’ emigration. Although initially Israel hoped that all 1948 refugees would be transferred to Arab countries within a forthcoming mutual Arab-Israeli peace deal, it was not long before Israeli officials began taking matters into their own hands. They developed an economic policy for the Strip, based on high unemployment rates and low standard of living, aimed at encouraging Gazans, and particularly refugees, to leave of their own accord. In the first year following its introduction, this policy led to approximately 3,000 Palestinians per month leaving the Strip, but this stream of humanity met an obstacle in late 1968 when Jordan banned Gazans from entering, at the same time as popular resistance to Israeli rule grew in the Strip. To contain the resistance, the government introduced a new economic policy for the Gaza Strip in early 1969, designed to diminish unemployment and improve the standard of living. It was

also constructed in such a way as to encourage the emigration of educated youth, perceived as being most likely to undermine Israeli rule and as possessing the ideal social characteristics for emigration. This new policy explains long-term demographic and economic patterns in Palestinian society and illuminates Israeli mechanisms of control in the Gaza Strip since 1967.

The concepts of population transfer and encouraged emigration were not new for the Israeli leadership in 1967. They had been part of pre-statehood Zionist discourse decades earlier as a means to bridge the gap between territorial aspirations and demographic realities.⁶ The new empirical findings and their analysis will demonstrate how these ideas were integrated into the construction of Israeli control over the Gaza Strip.

Israeli cabinet discussions on the Gaza Strip and its refugees: June 1967

On 14 June 1967, a few days after the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) defeated the Arab armies and conquered the Golan Heights from Syria, the Sinai Peninsula and the Gaza Strip from Egypt and the West Bank from Jordan, the Israeli cabinet met to discuss Israel's next moves on the political front. Abba Eban, Minister of Foreign Affairs, summarized international views regarding the outcomes of the war, expressing his concern over the opposing positions of the United States and the Soviet Union. Everyone in the room clearly recalled how both superpowers forced Israel to withdraw, fully and unconditionally, from the Arab lands it had occupied during the 1956 Sinai Campaign. Eban explained that the Soviet Union was again demanding an immediate Israeli withdrawal from all occupied territories. But unlike 1956, he added, the US was ready to back Israel in the international arena and provide full diplomatic support against Soviet pressure, in return for which the Americans expected Israel to enter peace negotiations with the Arab states using its territorial gains as bargaining chips. This position meant that Israel was expected to compromise on parts of its territorial gains, but also that it could keep a portion to itself. The US also demanded that, within these negotiations, Israel be part of a solution for the 1948 refugee problem. Thus, the ministers realized that a resolution for the refugees would be inherently connected to the political status of the Gaza Strip, where most 1948 refugees under Israeli control resided.⁷

Around 700,000 Palestinians were uprooted from their homes and lands in the 1948 War and moved to refugee camps in the Gaza Strip, Jordan, Syria, and Lebanon, making the 1948 Palestinian refugee problem a focal point of the Arab-Israeli conflict. American diplomats were engaged in negotiations between Israel and the Arab states to resolve this political and humanitarian crisis. American solutions, such as those presented in the Lausanne Convention of 1949, called for population transfer and resettlement of Palestinian refugees, moves considered at the time to be the preferred method for solving ethnic clashes in disputed territories. US plans for solving the problem proposed that most refugees would be resettled in Arab states, while a smaller portion of them would be resettled by the Israeli government in Israel. Both sides rejected this proposal. The Arab countries demanded that Israel take back all refugees, while Israel demanded that the Arab countries should absorb them, arguing that Israel's domestic stability and national security depended on having a strong Jewish majority.⁸ In the aftermath of the 1967 War, some Israeli ministers quietly acknowledged the irrelevance of this old argument when over a million Palestinians, about one quarter of them 1948 refugees, came under direct Israeli control.⁹

After several discussions, the cabinet reached its resolutions on 19 June 1967, and these were to be shared in confidence only with the US government: the Israeli government proposed to withdraw its forces from Sinai and the Golan Heights in exchange for peace with Egypt and Syria. It agreed to postpone discussing the status of the West Bank, stated that the Gaza Strip would remain Israeli territory, and that peace in the Middle East would 'open opportunities' for a settlement of the refugee problem.¹⁰ Behind the scenes, the ministers agreed that although the Gaza Strip would be Israeli eventually, immediate annexation was a thing of the future, as it would entail granting Israeli citizenship to all 400,000 inhabitants. Because the 1948 refugees

amounted to half of the Strip population, the thinking was that annexation would follow a resettlement plan in Arab countries that would be part of an Arab-Israeli peace deal. The ministers expected the Arabs to enter negotiations defeated, overwhelmed, and ready to accept Israeli terms which they had previously rejected, making the prospect of a population transfer from the Strip seem attainable.¹¹ In contrast to this consensus, the political future of the West Bank and its 600,000 Palestinian residents was the focus of extensive debate in the Israeli government. Although the West Bank was perceived by the ministers as an integral part of the Jewish homeland, many of them expressed grave concerns over the demographic consequences of annexing it to Israel. 1948 refugees were only 10 per cent of the West Bank population, thus the implementation of a transfer and resettlement scheme would not reduce the number of Arabs there in any significant way.¹²

Aiming to meet US expectations, Israel expressed readiness to repatriate some of the refugees as part of a peace deal, albeit not in the refugees' original residences, now within the state of Israel, but in the Occupied Territories. The ministers disagreed on where in the Territories should they resettle the refugees from the Strip. Two locations were proposed: the northern part of the West Bank and El-Arish in the Sinai Peninsula. Prime Minister Levi Eshkol supported the West Bank idea, arguing that the conditions there were favourable, as there was enough available land and water resources for the large-scale construction of new towns. He envisioned the proposed area as not remaining under full Israeli sovereignty, rather becoming a self-ruled autonomy.¹³ The El-Arish option was proposed by Minister of Labor Yigal Allon, who thought that transferring refugees to a closer destination, a few kilometres south-west of the Strip, would be easier, perhaps assuming that this area would not be included within the future borders of Israel.¹⁴ No discussion revealed any interest in the desires of the refugees themselves, nor did anyone consider the possibility of their resistance to a resettlement plan. On the contrary, the ministers assumed that the refugees would be glad to move from 'wretched huts' to 'beautiful residential centers'.¹⁵ Many even expressed a sincere, though somewhat naïve, hope that this type of solution would diminish the hatred between Jews and Arabs in the Middle East.¹⁶

The idea that Israel should carry out a policy to encourage emigration from the Gaza Strip, while preparing for an agreed transfer, was also discussed. In contrast to the large-scale nature of transferring an entire population, the ministers viewed emigration policies as a means of pushing individuals to leave on their own accord. They believed the harsh living conditions in the camps would drive refugees to leave for other countries, such as oil-rich Gulf states, in search of a better future for themselves and their families. They also thought that overseas countries with flexible emigration policies, such as Brazil, Canada, and Australia could be a destination. Trade and Industry Minister, Ze'ev Sherf, for example, told the ministers that just in the previous ten years Brazil had absorbed tens of thousands of migrant workers from Japan, and wondered: 'Why wouldn't they absorb Arabs as well?'¹⁷ Other ministers expressed similar expectations. During these discussions, the ministers tended to use vague language when speaking of the refugee problem, insinuating a desire to see Arab emigration in general, not just of refugees, and not only from the Strip. Some stressed the necessity of encouraging 'emigration from Gaza', while others emphasized the need to urge 'Arab emigration'.¹⁸ No concrete decision was made on the matter of policy, but the discussions revealed the spirit of the leadership on a mixed territorial and demographic dilemma. The government hoped to generate a demographic shift in the Gaza Strip so their vision of annexation would slowly, but safely, become a reality.

The beginnings of Israeli emigration policies: August–November 1967

The head of the Israeli control apparatus over the Territories was the iconic Israeli general and Minister of Defense, Moshe Dayan, and his were the first direct instructions to encourage emigration. In late July 1967, Dayan ordered the Gaza Strip military governor to organize daily shuttles, free of charge, from the Strip's refugee camps to the West Bank, hoping to 'open the eyes' of

refugees to the relatively higher standard of living over there. Dayan assumed that unemployed and disenfranchised refugees in the Strip would be eager to emigrate to regions with better opportunities, and viewed the West Bank as an intermediate point on the way to Arab countries, such as Jordan or Kuwait where the refugees would have plenty of employment opportunities.¹⁹ The free shuttles ran for roughly a month, but whether anyone moved to the West Bank is unknown. What is known is that not a single Gazan crossed the border into Jordan during this month, a fact that did not deter Dayan from embarking on a much more grandiose endeavour.²⁰

In late August, Dayan ordered the lifting of all restrictions on movement from the Strip to the West Bank and back, so that all Gazans, both residents and refugees, could travel freely to the West Bank without Israeli interception, and return home at the end of the trip.²¹ The only limitation was that Gazans had to travel directly to the West Bank, without spending any time in Israeli towns. Dayan's move was revolutionary, as since 1948, Gazans had been required to attain special permits from the Egyptian or Israeli rulers if they wished to leave the Strip. With restrictions lifted, many Gazans seized the opportunity to travel to the West Bank, as attested by numerous reports from contemporary Israeli newspapers depicting 'a flood' of Gazans over the southern part of Israel. Reporters described how refugees used the opportunity to knock on doors of their previous homes such as in the town of Beer-Sheva in violation of the prohibition on such visits.²²

From Dayan's point of view, the large movement of population was a success. On 17 September 1967, he announced to the government that his plan had already shown results – forty unemployed men from the Strip had been hired by an Arab farmer from the Jordan Valley where the demand for manpower in agriculture was high. Dayan proudly declared that after a few days of hard labour in the hot valley sun all forty men crossed the Jordan River to Jordan.²³ Dayan believed that this example represented the forthcoming pattern of population movement. 'This is their transfer' [*ze-hu ha-transfer shel'hem*], Dayan declared with great confidence later that day to a smaller forum of ministers.²⁴

Though ambitious, Dayan's initiatives were largely improvised. A more organized planning process began in September of 1967, when the subject of emigration policy was handed over to a special subcommittee of The Chief of Staff Committee for Civilian Matters in the Administrated Territories (CSC). The CSC was responsible for all civil affairs in the Occupied Territories. The members of the subcommittee were senior civil servants and military personnel, and included the military governor of the Gaza Strip, Mordechai Gur, Dayan's senior advisor, former Chief of Staff Zvi Zur, and the coordinator of government activities in the Territories, officer Shlomo Gazit (all three can be described as Dayan's loyalists in the security forces). The Subcommittee first met on 28 September 1967, and a main subject on its agenda was 'population transfer from the Strip to the [West] Bank'.²⁵ Subcommittee members agreed that emigration policies from the Strip should be based on a push-and-pull model. The push would be Gaza's low standards of living and high unemployment rates, and the pull was the higher standard of living and lower unemployment rates in the West Bank. Governor Gur explained his role in the scheme, announcing that his subjects would feel 'hopeless' regarding their economic conditions.²⁶ Nonetheless, Gur added a warning that exerting heavy pressure on the Strip would 'lead to a revolt' [*yavi le-yedey meri*].²⁷ As pull factors, the Subcommittee decided to create public works in the West Bank for unemployed refugees from the Strip. Gazit, Dayan's right hand in the Territories, concluded the meeting by saying that to push Gazans all the way to the East Bank, the military government must also create 'an atmosphere of population mobility'. He did not clarify what he meant by that statement.²⁸

The next meeting of the Subcommittee took place on October 12 and was dedicated to the details of the 'population transfer' plan. The participants decided to place the public works for unemployed Gazans near Jericho in the Jordan Valley, an area in need of a workforce, but also – and important for the plan – only a few kilometres from the Allenby Bridge which led to the East Bank. From the Jericho area 'it is easy to walk eastward' explained former Chief of Staff Zur to a ministerial committee supervising the work of the CSC, later that month.²⁹ The

Subcommittee agreed upon two types of public works to attract unemployed refugees from Gaza to the Jordan Valley: the construction of a new road alongside the Dead Sea, between Ein Feshkha and Ein Gedi, and agriculture works (the exact nature of which was not mentioned). In addition, they added new incentives for potential migrants from the Strip: a grant of 35 Israeli Lira (IL) (equivalent to an average weekly salary in the Strip) for every refugee who would emigrate on his own to the Jordan Valley and food packages for refugees who would move with their entire families, equivalent to the food rations they were entitled to in the camps.³⁰ The emigration of families was a priority for the Israelis, not only in terms of numbers. The United Nations Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA), which was responsible for managing the camps since 1949, provided aid and services to all Palestinian refugees. As a policy, UNRWA did not cross off the name of a refugee from its lists if there was at least one family member in the camp to collect the food rations on his behalf, and thus even if a specific refugee emigrated to a distant location, Kuwait for example, he or she could always return to their original refugee camp as long as they had a family member there.³¹

On 13 October, the day after the Transfer Subcommittee crafted its emigration plans, Dayan signed a secret official document, titled 'Operational Principles for the Administrated Territories', prepared by top officials from the Israeli civil service and the security forces. The document opens with a statement on the five 'basic aims' of the Israeli control apparatus in the Territories, of which the second and third were concerned with reducing the number of Arabs in the Territories.³² Clause 2 stated that it was a basic aim of the military government to reduce the number of Arabs in the Territories. This aim was clarified by Clause 3, which stated that 'special emphasis' should be given to the 'evacuation of Gaza Strip, and especially refugee camps in the Strip', and that the movement from the Strip to the West Bank is 'also considered a solution in the right direction'.³³ The document reveals a clear desire on the part of the Israeli leadership to see the demographic makeup between the river and the sea tilt favourably toward the Jewish population. However, this was part of a hierarchical geo-demographic perception. The highest priority was the emigration of refugees from the Gaza Strip, then came the residents of the Strip, and finally residents of the West Bank. As this document discloses, in October of 1967, the military government saw emigration policies from the Gaza Strip as one of its top priorities.

The centrality of the Israeli 'transfer' ambitions from the Strip was also manifested in the first Israeli budget for the Occupied Territories. On 5 November 1967, Dan Hiram, CSC Coordinator, wrote a document entitled 'Guidelines for the Perpetration of a 1967/1968 Budget for the Civil Administration [in the Territories]'.³⁴ At the top part of the first page, under the headline 'Basic Premises', the document stated:

Easing the movement of residents eastward – from the Gaza Strip to the West Bank and from the West Bank to the East Bank – must be realized in all realms of our activities. The execution will be based on economic measures, and not on administrative orders; aspire to a reasonable standard of living in these territories, approximately close to that which existed there before the occupation began. The movement of manpower from the Territories to Israel is not allowed. Manpower movement to the East Bank is one-way [*had sitrit*].³⁵

In the next paragraph, Hiram continued to clarify that unemployment rates in the Strip should be 'close' to pre-war ones.³⁶ After the war, the unemployment rate among men (over the age of 15) in the Strip was 74 per cent, compared to 55 per cent before the war. What this meant for the military government was lifting the employment rate back from 26 per cent to no more than 45 per cent.³⁷ The prohibition on unemployed Gazans working in the Israeli economy was one means of keeping unemployment rates from crossing the 55 per cent threshold. The budget instructed the military government not to create any new sources of livelihood for refugees. A 'development' clause in the budget allotted public funds for the public works in the Jordan Valley. There, the budget says, the 'scope of projects at any time will match the absorption of the stream of refugees'.³⁸ The budget guidelines also show us that the Israelis did not view a

forceful expulsion of Gazans as an option, as such an act would affect crucial American support. Instead, the Israelis used economic tools to manipulate Palestinians to voluntarily leave their homeland. At this stage, emigration from the Strip was no longer an Israeli vision or even a plan on paper, but a funded policy.

The Israeli emigration policies, as manifested in government discourse, the CSC Subcommittee plan, the 'Operational Principles', and the budget guidelines, began to show results in the last months of 1967. According to IDF records, between 6 June and 31 August 1967, no resident or refugee from the Gaza Strip crossed over to Jordan or departed in any other way. But this was about to change. In September 1967, 80 Gazans emigrated, in October the number grew to 850, and in November to 2,796. Between December 1967 and July 1968, the monthly average of migrants from the Strip was 2,802.³⁹ When the Israelis began counting migrants from the Strip in thousands, not in tens or even hundreds, the idea that emigration policies could achieve a substantial impact on the Strip's demography seemed like a reasonable conclusion, and the ultimate annexation of the Strip to Israel as a plausible outcome. Clearly, this was how Dayan saw matters when he declared in a briefing on 9 January 1968 to the Knesset Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee, that he believed that 'with the right treatment [*be-tipul nakhon*] it is possible to remove from Gaza a large portion of the refugees and perhaps even most of them'.⁴⁰

Levi Eshkol's secret emigration agency: February–July 1968

By late 1967, both Washington and Jerusalem deemed an Arab-Israeli peace deal in the foreseeable future highly unlikely. On 1 September 1967, the Arab League declared its Three Nos in Khartoum – no peace with Israel, no recognition of Israel, and no negotiations with it. Additionally, the US narrowed its involvement in the Middle East as a result of its entanglement in the Vietnam War. Finally, on 22 November, the UN Security Council, represented by both superpowers, adopted Resolution 242 enshrining the principle of the exchange of land for peace. Israel viewed the resolution as a diplomatic victory because it removed the option of unconditional withdrawal, and with it the pressure to make more compromises.⁴¹ These new circumstances made early Israeli expectations for a coordinated resettlement enterprise in neighbouring Arab countries irrelevant. The Israeli government was left with only one tool to retain the Gaza Strip without its people – emigration policies.

To discuss the matter of emigration from the Strip, on 7 December 1967 Prime Minister Eshkol met with two of Israel's most esteemed professors, demographer Roberto Bachi, and mathematician Arie Dvoretzky. The two were appointed by Eshkol himself back in July to head a special long-term planning committee, named the Committee for the Development of the Administrated Territories (CDAT). Two main CDAT objectives were the preparation of a plan for the Palestinian refugees and the crafting of emigration policies.⁴² Eshkol, while briefing his guests on the latest international developments, mentioned that the US no longer pressured Israel on the refugee matter. In fact, he continued, the American resettlement plans had already returned 'to the drawer'. Israel was facing two options, Eshkol added: either to wait and see whether other nations were willing to take a resettlement project upon themselves, or to initiate an Israeli transfer and resettlement plan within the Territories for the entire refugee population. The problem, Eshkol concluded, was that the first option was unrealistic and the second undesirable.⁴³

When asked by Professor Bachi what exactly the government's position regarding the Gaza Strip was, Eshkol responded: 'Regarding Arabs in Gaza – I hope they will all scatter [*yistalku*] out of Israel.' This answer perfectly encapsulated Eshkol's concept of the Strip and its people – he naturally thought of Gaza as part of Israel and its population as a removable element. Professor Bachi, however, was baffled by the Prime Minister's response because it implied the disposal of all Gazans from the Strip. He asked for further clarifications, and after a lengthy conversation, Eshkol made it clear that his main aspiration was the removal of all refugees, although he did not yet have a coherent emigration policy to realize this goal. Bachi was surprised, not so much

by the goal, but by Eshkol's high expectations of emigration policies. He pointed out that such policies are a secondary tool that could at best freeze the natural growth of the population. To better explain himself he used a metaphor: 'To exterminate the fruit from the vineyard – for that you need to prepare a different plan.'⁴⁴ The vineyard obviously represented the refugee camps. Bachi was alluding to the CDAT plan for refugees, prepared by economist Michael Bruno and handed over to Eshkol on 10 September 1967. The Bruno plan outlined steps to transfer and resettle a population of 250,000 Palestinian refugees in the West Bank over a ten-year period by constructing new towns and industrializing the local economy.⁴⁵ Bachi believed in the Bruno plan, but the Prime Minister already had other ideas. Eshkol told the two professors about a conversation he had had a day earlier with the IDF General Staff. They all believed, Eshkol said, that Israeli control over the entire West Bank would persist for a long period of time and was a top priority for Israel's security. If the West Bank were to remain in Israeli hands, Eshkol wondered, why transfer Arabs there? When the refugees are in the Strip, Eshkol said, at least the military can pressure them to move elsewhere. Eshkol also wondered why the Israeli government should invest its budget in the industrialization of the West Bank for the benefit of refugees, as Bruno advised, at the expense of the development of 'Israel itself'.⁴⁶ Despite Bachi's repeated warnings, Eshkol had already made up his mind. He abandoned the concept of a collective resettlement and placed his trust in emigration policies to accomplish the same demographic results.

Eshkol became even more entrenched in his new position after visiting US President Lyndon Johnson, in his Texas Ranch on 7-8 January 1968. Eshkol was nervous prior to the trip, worried that Johnson would put him on the spot to make more territorial concessions to the Arab states.⁴⁷ Johnson, however, had no such intentions. During the visit, Eshkol learned that the Americans no longer perceived peace in the Middle East as possible, and that they held the Arabs at fault. Eshkol took advantage of the opportunity to cautiously share with President Johnson his vision of emigration policies as a 'solution' to the Palestinian refugee problem, to which Johnson responded that the idea was unrealistic, but if all refugees indeed moved to Kuwait it would make him 'very happy'.⁴⁸ With the green light (or at least yellow) from the US president, Eshkol began pursuing what he perceived to be one of Israel's highest interests – having the 1948 refugees leave the Strip.

Shortly after his return to Israel, Eshkol began organizing a secret agency to promote and increase emigration from the Strip. By now it was clear to the Israelis that secrecy was a crucial component of a successful emigration policy. They knew that the Palestinian refugees were overwhelmingly adamant about returning to their original homes and lands inside Israel, and vehemently opposed all other solutions. Moreover, the refugees were ready to resist any formal policy to vacate their camps.⁴⁹ Eshkol appointed Ada Sereni to head the secret emigration agency, a woman he valued as having clandestine talents and valuable expertise in human migration as she had organized mass illegal Jewish immigration to Mandatory Palestine as the head of the undercover organization *Ha-Mosad Le-Aliya Bet*. Sereni's agency was officially established in a 19 February 1968 meeting at the Prime Minister's office. In addition to Eshkol and Sereni, the gathering included the highest officials in the Israeli security forces, including the head of the Shin Bet, Yosef Hermelin, and the head of the Mossad, Meir Amit. Once again, discussion of emigration policies led to referring to South American countries as possible emigration destinations. Brazil is so large, Eshkol remarked during the discussion, that once refugees moved there, 'no one will even know they exist'.⁵⁰

Eshkol was certain that Gazans were so desperate to leave the Strip for economic reasons, that they would do so at the first opportunity. Initially he ordered Sereni not to make cash payments for emigration, reasoning that if the refugees knew that someone was willing to pay them to leave, they would prolong their stay to bargain over the price. He wanted the refugees to feel worthless, and cash would give them a sense of value. To clarify his point, Eshkol gave Sereni an example from the days of his youth in Czarist Russia at the turn of the twentieth century. He told her that the Jews in Russia were so impoverished and desperate to emigrate

to America that they overpaid travel agencies despite fully knowing that the price was inflated. His point was that Eastern European Jews had no choice but to emigrate, and the Palestinian refugees, Eshkol seemed to believe, felt the same way. He estimated that around 80 per cent of the refugees would leave the Strip by themselves, and then, when only 20 per cent remained, it would make sense to consider payments for their emigration.⁵¹

From the onset, Sereni disagreed with Eshkol, but initially preferred to accept his instructions. Identifying travel expenses as the main obstacle for potential migrants, she decided to arrange free buses from Gaza to the Allenby Bridge, and from there to a refugee camp near the village of Karamah in the East Bank. She gradually enlisted fifteen Arabic-speaking Jewish Israelis to the agency, whose assignment was to move around the refugee camps and spread information on the free travel arrangements.⁵² The push and pull model, crafted by Dayan's men in the autumn of 1967, remained the basis of the agency's activities, however their pull factors were no longer public works in the Jordan Valley, but rather the growing economy in Jordan.

Karamah, the place to which Sereni led refugees in buses, was also the headquarters of the Fatah movement. Established by Palestinian refugees in 1959, the Fatah was a Palestinian national movement that aspired to liberate Palestine by armed struggle. Beginning in early 1968, Fatah fighters launched frequent guerrilla attacks from Jordanian soil against Israeli targets in the Jordan Valley area. In a top-secret document Sereni composed for Eshkol on 26 March 1968, and in a personal briefing, she described a correlation between the emigration of refugees from the Gaza Strip to the East Bank and the growth of Fatah in Jordan. According to Sereni, since migrants from the Strip were impoverished and on the verge of starvation, refugee camps in the East Bank were the only possible destinations for them. These camps were exactly where Fatah drew most of its support, enlisting cadres of refugees to its ranks. When a young Palestinian refugee from the Strip arrived at one of those camps, Sereni continued, his only alternative was to join Fatah and fight against Israel. Moreover, she argued, Fatah's revolutionary ideology and pro-Nasserist tendencies endangered the stability of the conservative Hashemite Kingdom, considered by Israel to be a relatively friendly force in the region. The emigration from the Strip to the East Bank would only increase Israeli security concerns, Sereni stated, and concluded that the solution was a cash-for-emigration policy. The payments would enable refugees to travel as far as the Gulf countries and resettle there, far from the Fatah bases of support. As for Eshkol's earlier objection to payments, Sereni added that any refugee bargaining attempts could be easily suppressed by Israeli security forces.⁵³

This update took place a few days after Eshkol had ordered a massive military ground attack against Fatah's headquarters in Karamah. In the battle of Karamah, which took place on 21 March 1968, IDF forces destroyed the Fatah headquarters and killed 157 Fatah fighters. The Fatah and Jordanian forces defenders killed 33 Israeli soldiers. What made the invasion a disaster for Israel were the images of burning and deserted Israeli tanks in the fields near Karamah. These images were widely distributed around the Arab world and perceived by Palestinians throughout the Middle East as a resounding national victory. In Palestinian eyes, the Fatah fighters had proved that the IDF could be defeated, less than a year after its victory over a coalition of Arab armies. Consequently, a wave of young Palestinians joined Fatah's ranks, eager to confront Israel on the battlefield.⁵⁴ Eshkol and his generals had not expected this result of the invasion. Another unexpected consequence of the Karamah battle was its impact on the Israeli emigration polices.

The Jordanian government understood, just as Sereni did, that emigration from the Strip undermined its regime. Not only was Fatah a revolutionary movement in the realm of a monarchy, its para-military attacks on Israel drew the Jordanian army to constant undesired clashes with the IDF. Following the battle of Karamah, Jordanian guards at the Allenby Bridge began beating drivers of the free shuttles from the Strip. In addition, Sereni's men on the ground in the refugee camps reported back to her that refugees were beginning to perceive Jordan as an unstable and unsafe destination. The accumulation of these circumstances led Sereni, with Eshkol's approval, to introduce a cash-for-emigration policy, starting on 13 May 1968, aimed at

giving migrants the means to successfully acclimate in a distant location. From that point, the secret emigration agency paid 50 IL to emigrating individuals and 250 IL per family – if all members left together.⁵⁵

Data collected by the Israeli security forces show emigration from the Strip remained relatively stable even after Jordanian guards started harassing the shuttle drivers – 2,300 in May 1968, 1,937 in June, and 2,144 in July.⁵⁶ It is possible that Sereni's payments were the critical factor in maintaining the momentum of emigration during these months. However, on 30 July 1968, the Jordanian government decided to bar Gazans completely from its territory.⁵⁷ The Israeli emigration policy crumbled. After the road eastward was blocked, the number of migrants from the Strip dropped to only 50 in August of 1968, 46 in September and 25 in October.⁵⁸ It is unclear from the available sources how long the secret emigration agency existed in the Strip afterwards. In any case, as we shall see next, the entire rationale behind the Israeli policies in the Strip was about to change, along with the methods and goals of Israeli emigration policies.

Educated youth as a security threat and as ideal migrants

Grenades, mines, and firearms directed at Israeli troops and civilians became a routine sight in the Gaza Strip from late 1968 and throughout 1969. Members of Fatah and the National Front for the Liberation of Palestine (NFLP), who stood behind most armed attacks, blended into the crowded refugee camps where they found shelter and popular support. During 1969, for example, they launched 471 armed attacks against Israeli targets, killing ten Israelis and injuring 109.⁵⁹ In addition to the growth in armed resistance, a massive unarmed protest erupted in the form of mass demonstrations, with high-school girls being most prominent activists in these protests. Using civil disobedience tactics, the girls would come to school in the mornings, and then exit the classrooms all at once, and march through the streets calling pro-Fatah slogans and raising Palestinian flags. Israeli security forces perceived such displays of civil disobedience as a severe challenge, and in response, they turned high-pressure water hoses at demonstrators, arrested leaders, and beat demonstrators with clubs. But the demonstrations, just as the armed resistance, persisted.⁶⁰

The growing Gazan resistance against the occupying regime, and the decline in emigration, led the Israelis to re-examine their policies in the Strip. As we have seen, the governor of the Gaza Strip, Gur, had already expressed concern over the implications of economic pressure on the prospect of a revolt against Israeli rule. However, as long as emigration from the Strip continued, the demographic goal was perceived as a higher priority. When it became obvious that circumstances had changed, Israeli security forces began viewing the economic-pressure policy as unreasonable. According to this new view, caught between limited chances for livelihood and little chance of leaving, young Palestinians in the Strip would resort to joining the resistance as their only logical step. The Israelis also realized that the Palestinian national movement provided youth in the Strip with a platform to shape their own political future while applying revolutionary concepts. Equally important from the Israeli perspective was that recruits to the national movement were given a salary. Through interrogation of captured Fatah and NFLP fighters from the Strip, Israeli security forces concluded that around half the fighters had been driven to join the resistance by poverty, rather than by national aspirations. In order to maintain firm Israeli control in the Gaza Strip, they concluded, Israel had to raise the standard of living and lower unemployment rates.⁶¹

Embracing the security forces' recommendations, in early February of 1969 the Israeli government completely reversed its policy in Gaza. Instead of economic pressure, the government introduced a new economic policy aiming to lift the standard of living and lower unemployment rates. On 9 February 1969, the government made the critical decision to admit Palestinians from the Strip to work in Israel, mainly as manual and unskilled labourers.⁶² Workers from the West Bank had been allowed into the Israeli work market six months earlier, following lengthy discussions. However, Gazans had been explicitly excluded from the previous permit, in line with the

understanding that keeping unemployment high was crucial to encouraging emigration from the Strip.⁶³ There was a major wage gap between the modern-industrial Israeli economy and the traditional-agrarian Palestinian economy. While Israeli employers could exploit a cheap labour force from the Strip to increase their output and to lower prices, Gazans could earn significantly more in Israel than they could in the Strip. As a result, Gazans could not only find livelihood but also increase their purchasing power of consumer goods. The new economic programme, however, kept the local economy dependent on Israel, preventing the development of local growth.⁶⁴

Despite embracing a new economic policy for the Strip, the Israeli leadership had not abandoned demographic ambitions altogether. The main question for this leadership now was how to continue encouraging emigration from the Strip while also improving the population's economic conditions. The solution was a selective emigration paradigm, which targeted a specific profile of Gazans: educated youth. From the security forces' perspective, educated youth matched the profile of typical national movement fighters or protest organizers. As they saw it, every young educated male or female who left the Strip was one less potential Palestinian to fight. From a demographic perspective, educated young people had the best emigration potential because their ambitions extended beyond the tight boundaries of the Strip. They aimed at higher education and obtaining a profession in a region that had no institutions of higher education (as was also the case in the West Bank), and skilled labourers were rarely needed in the Strip's agrarian economy. Israel reserved skilled labour positions for Jewish Israelis, and admission to Israeli universities was unfeasible. For educated young people, the road to a fulfilling professional life led out of the Strip. Moreover, the Israelis hoped that a wave of young educated migrants would spur a larger wave of families in its aftermath. Still, the leading goal of the new emigration paradigm was to reinforce Israeli rule, not necessarily to overhaul Palestinian demography.⁶⁵

The first concrete proposal under this new paradigm was handed to the Ministerial Committee for the Territories (MCT) by Minister of Defense Dayan. On 24 April 1969, Dayan proposed to allow all high schools in the Strip to go back to using Egyptian textbooks, which had been replaced by Israeli-issued books in Arabic in the summer of 1967, because, the authorities claimed, the Egyptian books contained anti-Israeli rhetoric. Dayan explained that until 1967 pupils in the Strip took the Egyptian matriculation exams at the end of high school, and those who passed were automatically entitled to admission to Egyptian universities, so that thousands of high-school graduates had left the Strip for the purpose of higher education every year. However, if they followed the Israeli curriculum, Gazan students could not matriculate under the Egyptian system. Dayan maintained that returning Egyptian textbooks to the Strip would reopen the possibility of emigrating to Egypt after high school. For Dayan emigration was vital first and foremost as a means of control:

If it works out, and let's assume there's a financial grant and partial payment of travel expenses, then 5,000-6,000 of these young people would go [every year] and hopefully we'll never see them back [here] again. If we are preparing emigration plans, this emigration is the most important one, because this crowd is the rowdiest [*ki ze ha-tsibur ha-mitpare'a be-yoter*]. As I said before, this is my reason for supporting it [the policy], to get rid of them, because the Gaza Strip is a place from which people have to be removed.⁶⁶

A few ministers disapproved of Dayan's plan, among them Menahem Begin, leader of the right-wing Gahal Party. Begin argued that replacing Israeli textbooks with Egyptian ones was a counterproductive step for their ultimate goal of annexing the Strip. It sends the population a message, he said, that the Israeli rulers are only there temporarily, and that the Egyptians would soon take over again. Dayan's response was a warning:

The result will be that all of these pupils, high-school graduates will sit in cafes, and will transform into the most provoking crowd [*La-tsibur ha-matsis be-yoter*]..... It will be a less comfortable crowd for us, both because it is educated and because we don't have employment

for them [in Israel], with all the shortcomings, with all the Fatah potential, the terror and the anti-Israeli propaganda [*hasata*].⁶⁷

Dayan's proposal was accepted by a majority vote of the ministers. One year later, the first Egyptian matriculation exams took place in the Strip under Israeli rule. The United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) mediated an arrangement according to which Egypt guaranteed annual university admission to 1,500 of about 5,000 matriculating students from the Strip. Consequently, from 1970 to 1978, 1,500 Palestinian students travelled to Egypt every year to gain higher education. In 1978, Egyptian President Anwar Sadat, cancelled this arrangement in response to mass demonstrations in the Strip against his peace deal with Israel.⁶⁸

A second proposal that manifested the new paradigm was placed on the MCT's table on 29 May 1969, by Zvi Zamir, Head of the Mossad. As we have seen, South America had been mentioned repeatedly as a possible destination for Arabs from the Strip. With this in mind, Mossad agents contacted state officials in South American countries, trying to interest them in migrant workers from the Gaza Strip. In May of 1969 their efforts bore fruit when an agent of the Mossad reached a deal with a representative of the Paraguayan government. According to Zamir, the Paraguayan government agreed to grant 60,000 work visas to refugees from the Strip over a period of four years. The work visas would be valid in most South American countries, including Brazil. Anyone who carried a work visa and was employed for a period of five years was eligible for Paraguayan citizenship. Paraguay demanded the following conditions of the Israeli government: Israel would cover all travel expenses for the migrants, and give each migrant USD 100 for initial expenses. In addition, Israel would pay the government of Paraguay USD 33 for each migrant, with a down payment of USD 330,000 for the first 10,000 migrants. Finally, Israel would guarantee that the migrants were not communists. After no objections were voiced in the MCT, the agreement was approved. Both governments wanted to keep the agreement secret. After all, it was a conspiracy. The down payment of 330,000 was used to bribe Paraguayan officials, and secrecy on the Israeli side was necessary to hinder possible efforts by refugees to organize collective resistance to the move.⁶⁹

Although both governments kept the plan a state secret, it was soon revealed. On 4 May 1970 two young Gazans, who had landed in Paraguay a month earlier and were still unemployed entered the Israeli embassy in Asunción and opened fire. Their motive remains unknown – they may have intended to assassinate the ambassador or extort money from him. Either way, the situation escalated when the two shot and killed the ambassador's secretary, whom they suspected was calling the police. In court, the two testified that Israel had tempted them to emigrate from the Gaza Strip to Paraguay; however, few people believed their story. Israel denied their testimonies, referred to as absurd allegations, and accused Fatah of international terrorism. Despite Israeli denial, the spotlight on the tragic murder case terminated the secret transfer scheme. The number of Gazans who emigrated to Paraguay in that period is unknown, but apparently it never exceeded a few dozen individuals. Even before the plan was exposed, the low numbers demonstrated its futility.⁷⁰

By August 1969, Israeli Prime Minister Golda Meir, who succeeded the late Eshkol, declared in a meeting of the MCT that solving the Palestinian refugee problem by implementing emigration policies was 'impossible'. Her government would continue the efforts to encourage selective emigration, she said, but anyone who thought that all refugees would 'pack their belongings and leave in a caravan' was 'delusional'.⁷¹

Conclusion

At the outset of the occupation, the Israeli leadership perceived the Gaza Strip as Israeli land and the Palestinian people living there as disposable. To confront the contradiction in its perceptions of the land and its inhabitants, the Israeli government attempted to transfer Palestinians

eastward to Jordan, westward to Egypt and overseas to South America, using economic incentives, not physical force. No group caused the Israeli leaders more anxiety than the 1948 Palestinian refugees, indigenous to the land that became the State of Israel. Since Israeli statehood in 1948 the refugee problem had cast a shadow over its legitimacy in the international arena and to its established firm Jewish majority. One could argue today, as many do argue, that the refugees' aspirations since 1948 and through the 1960s to implement 'the right of return' were unrealistic. As demonstrated here, Israeli hopes of making all refugees disappear were no less improbable, as all Israeli efforts to encourage Gazans to emigrate *en masse* failed, yielding unforeseeable results such as the reinforcement of Fatah in Jordan. After a year and a half of occupation, the question that faced Israel was not how it could remove as many Palestinians as possible, but how it could control them effectively, with the ultimate goal remaining to keep the Gaza Strip in Israeli hands. Even after the Israeli leadership reshaped its policies, proposals for emigration policies were embraced by the government as long as they also served the mechanisms of control.

Despite failure to achieve its ultimate demographic goals, Israeli emigration policies had a long-term effect on Palestinian demography in the Gaza Strip. According to the Israeli Central Bureau of Statistics, 94,200 Gazans (or 23.5 per cent of the Strip population in 1967) left the Strip between 1968 and 1987. Around one third of them, or 32,300, did so in 1968. The average number of migrants per year from the Strip between 1969 and 1987 was 3,257,⁷² with educated young people comprising the largest social group to emigrate.⁷³ As more men than women left to pursue employment, a gender imbalance evolved – in 1973, for example, only 41 per cent of Gazans aged 25–49 were men.⁷⁴ Following the Israeli decision of 1969 to pacify resistance by admitting labour from Gaza, the number of Gazans employed in Israel grew from 6,000 in 1970 to 28,000 in 1975 and 36,000 in 1980.⁷⁵ Hard manual labour in Israeli construction sites, agriculture fields, and factories was a humiliating experience for many Palestinians. However, Israeli wages improved the standard of living for Palestinians in the Strip dramatically. For example, the percentage of households in the Strip that had an electric refrigerator increased from 5.7 to 66.2 between 1972 and 1981, and the percentage of households that had a television set during the same years grew from 7.5 to 70.3.⁷⁶ From a Palestinian perspective, economic improvement was regarded as a form of political resistance, also known as *Sumud* or steadfastness, serving the objective of keeping the Palestinian people in their homeland.⁷⁷ This political perception was a mirror image of the Israeli perception of poor economic conditions as a catalyst for emigration.

Israeli ministers, officials, and officers in the late 1960s perceived themselves as social engineers who could craft their subordinate society as they desired. A basic tension existed between their territorial and demographic goals, making the full realization of any one of them implausible. While miserable economic conditions could have increased Palestinian emigration, they also contributed to popular unrest that undermined Israeli control. Improving economic conditions removed the main factor for mass emigration, at the same time making control more effective. A selective emigration policy targeting educated youth was a compromise that stressed the need for a steady occupation regime above all. Indeed, Israel succeeded in establishing a firm and stable system of direct control over the Strip that managed to contain local resistance for at least two decades, up to the first Intifada in 1987. Israeli policies, however, did not find any stable solution for the core issues of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Thus, Israelis and Gazans continued to struggle against each other in recurring cycles of violence such as in the first and second Intifadas, Operation Cast Lead and Operation Protective Edge. It seems that the Israeli government is still searching for the best policies to achieve its national goals in Gaza. In 2019, as it did five decades earlier, the Israeli cabinet discussed both how to encourage emigration from the Strip, and how economic improvements could contain the armed resistance.⁷⁸ In the meantime, thousands, and at times tens of thousands, of Palestinians continue to protest weekly in the 'Great March of Return', reminding Israelis and the international community that 1948 refugees, and their descendants, still demand to return to their lands.

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Notes

1. The new archival sources, formed during the years 1967-1969, were made available for scholars in 2016 and 2017. The Israel State Archives opened minutes of ministerial meetings of the following governmental agencies: the government, the security cabinet, the committee appointed by decision 692 (also known as the civil disobedience committee in the territories), the ministerial committee for the territories, and the ministerial committee for coordination between ministerial committees on the issue of the administrated territories. The Israel Defense Forces Archives opened a large number of files from the military government in the occupied territories. Of these files, only one document was used for the purpose of this article (see endnote 34 below). In 2017 the Israeli NGO *Akevot Institute for Israeli-Palestinian Conflict Research* uploaded to its website a crucial source for understanding the early years of the Israeli occupation regime named: 'meetings summaries of the chief of staff committee for civilian matters in the administrated territories', which the Israeli security ministry had, for an unknown reason, probably in the late 1970s, placed in a few Israeli libraries. Scholars have so far overlooked it, perhaps because its existence was largely unknown.
2. Ann M. Lesch, 'Gaza: Forgotten Corner of Palestine', *Journal of Palestine Studies* Vol.15, No.1 (1985), pp.43–61; Sara Roy, *The Gaza Strip: The Political Economy of De-development* (Washington, DC: Institute for Palestine Studies, 1995); Emanuel Marx, 'Palestinian Refugee in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip', *Middle Eastern Studies* Vol.28 No.2 (1992), pp.281–294; Nur Masalha, *The Politics of Denial: Israel and the Palestinian Refugee Problem* (London: Pluto Press, 2003), pp.178–217; Eyal Weitzman, *Hollow Land: Israel's Architecture of Occupation* (London: Verso, 2007); Niv Gordon, *Israel's Occupation* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2008); Jean Pierre Filiu, *Gaza: A History* (London: C. Hurst, 2014).
3. Tom Segev, 'The June 1967 War and the Palestinian Refugee Problem', *Journal of Palestine Studies* Vol. 36 No. 3 (2007), pp.6–22. Two Israeli journalists, relying on unnamed sources, were the first to expose the secret Israeli emigration policies from the late 1960s: see Yossi Melman and Dan Raviv, 'A Final Solution to the Palestinian Problem', *Guardian Weekly*, 21 February 1988.
4. Fatina Abreek Zubiedat and Alona Nitzan Shiftan, "De-Camping" through Development: The Palestinian Refugee Camps in the Gaza Strip under the Israeli Occupation', in Irit Katz, Diana Martin and Claudio Minca (eds), *Camps Revisited: Multifaceted Spatialities of a Modern Political Technology* (London; New York: Rowman & Littlefield International, 2018), pp.137–157.
5. Avi Raz, *The Bride and the Dowry: Israel, Jordan, and the Palestinians in the Aftermath of the June 1967 War* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2012), p.371, see note 28. Raz argued that lack of sufficient archival sources at the time made it unfeasible to examine the matter any further.
6. See for example: Benny Morris, 'Yosef Weitz and the Transfer Committee, 1948-1949', *Middle Eastern Studies* Vol. 22 No. 4 (1986), pp.522–561; Nur Masalha, *Expulsion of the Palestinians: The Concept of 'Transfer' in Zionist Political Thought, 1882–1948* (Washington D.C.: Institute for Palestine Studies, 1992); Nimrod Lin, 'The arithmetic of rights: Zionist intellectuals imagining the Arab minority May–July 1938', *Middle Eastern Studies* Vol. 54 Issue 6 (2018), pp.948–964.
7. 'Transcript of the Security Cabinet', 14 June 1967, Israel State Archives (ISA) ISA-PMO-MinisterialCommitteesSecurity-0013qq9.
8. Peter L. Hahn, *Caught in the Middle East: U.S. policy toward the Arab-Israeli conflict, 1945-1961* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2004), p.101; Arie J. Kochavi, 'The US, Britain and the Palestinians Refugee Question after the Six Day War', *Middle Eastern Studies*, Vol. 48 No. 4 (2012), pp.537–552; Avi Shlaim, *The Iron Wall* (New York: W.W. Norton, 2014), p.52; Frank Matthew, *Making Minorities History: Population Transfer in Twentieth-Century Europe* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017).
9. See for example: Minister of Justice, Ya'akov Shimshon Shapira, 'Transcript of the Government Meeting – morning and afternoon', 19 June 1967, ISA-PMO-GovernmentMeeting-0002ees, p. 37.
10. Avi Raz, 'The Generous Peace Offer that was Never Offered: The Israeli Cabinet Resolution of 19 June 1967', *Diplomatic History* Vol. 37 No. 1 (2013), p.86.

11. 'Transcript of the Security Cabinet (morning)', 15 June 1967, ISA-PMO-MinisterialCommitteesSecurity-0013qq9; 'Transcript of the Government Meeting (before noon)', 18 June 1967, ISA-PMO-GovernmentMeeting-0002ees; 'Transcript of the Government Meeting (After noon)', 18 June 1967, ISA-PMO-GovernmentMeeting-0002ees; 'Transcript of the Government Meeting (Morning and Afternoon)', 19 June 1967, ISA-PMO-GovernmentMeeting-0002ees.
12. Ibid.
13. 'Transcript of the Government Meeting (before noon)', 18 June 1967, ISA, pp.66, 80, 93–94.
14. 'Transcript of the Government Meeting (Morning and Afternoon)', 19 June 1967, ISA, pp.49–50.
15. Ibid.
16. See for example: 'Transcript of the Security Cabinet (morning)', 15 June 1967, ISA, p.28; 'Transcript of the Government Meeting (after noon)', 18 June 1967, ISA, pp.74, 108; 'Transcript of the Government Meeting (Morning and Afternoon)', 19 June 1967, ISA, pp.37–40, 60.
17. 'Transcript of the Government Meeting' (Morning and Afternoon), 19 June 1967, ISA, p.24.
18. Ibid; 'Transcript of the Security Cabinet (morning)', 15 June 1967, ISA; 'Protocol of the Government Meeting' (after noon), 18 June 1967, ISA.
19. 'Transcript of the ministerial committee appointed by decision 692 of the government', 29 July 1967, ISA-PMO-MinisterialCommittees-001f6hc (A-7354/1), pp.39–40.
20. 'Emigration from the Administrated Territories', 16 November 1968, ISA-mfa-Political-000mjqt (HTz-4296/11).
21. 'Transcript of the Government Meeting' (Morning and Afternoon), 17 September 1967, ISA, pp.91–92.
22. See for example: 'Aravim me-ha-retsoa "palshu" lebe'er sheva' [Arabs from the Strip "invaded" Beer-Sheva], *Maariv*, 3 September 1967; 'Toshavey Aza rabim bikru be-be'er sheva' [Many Gazans visited Beer-Sheva], *Al Hamishmar*, 3 September 1967.
23. 'Transcript of the Government Meeting (Morning and Afternoon)', 17 September 1967, ISA, pp.91–92.
24. 'Transcript of the ministerial committee appointed by decision 692 of the government', 19 September 1967, ISA-PMO-MinisterialCommittees-001f6hc (A-7354/1), pp.39–40.
25. The Israeli Defense Forces, *Sikumey yeshivot va'adat hamankalim le-tiful be-nose'em ha-ezrahe'em ba-shtahim ha-muhzakim* [Summaries of Meetings of the Chief of Staff Committee for Civilian Matters in the Administrated Territories Meeting] Vol. 1 (1977), pp.186–190.
26. Ibid.
27. Ibid.
28. Ibid.
29. 'Transcript of the ministerial committee for coordination between ministerial committees on the issue of the Administrated Territories', 29 October 1967, ISA-PMO-GovernmentSecretary-R0003n28 (A-7309/10), pp.7–8.
30. The Israeli Defense Forces, *Sikumey yeshivot va'adat hamankalim*, pp.200–201.
31. 'Transcript of the ministerial committee for coordination between ministerial committees on the issue of the Administrated Territories', 29 October 1967, ISA-PMO-GovernmentSecretary-R0003n28 (A-7309/10), pp.7–8. Only men paved the road along the Dead Sea. Available sources, however, do not reveal whether entire families moved with the workers to that region, as planned by the Israeli authorities.
32. Shlomo Gazit, *Ha-makel ve-hagezer: ha-mimshal ha-yisra'eli be-yehuda ve-shomron* [The Stick and the Carrot: The Israeli Administration in Judea and Samaria] (Tel Aviv: Zmora, Bitan, 1985), p.356.
33. Ibid.
34. 'Guidelines for the Perpetration of a 1967/1968 Budget for the Civil Administration', 5 November 1967, Israel Defense Forces Archives (IDFA) 224-51/1985.
35. Ibid.
36. Ibid.
37. The Israeli Bureau of Statistics, *Ha-gada ha-ma'aravit shel ha-yarden rezu'at aza ve-tsfon sinay, ramat hagolan: Netunim me-hapkida ha-klalit* [The West Bank, The Gaza Strip and northern Sinai, the Golan Heights: Data from the general population census], Vol. 4 (Jerusalem: 1967), pp.15–16.
38. 'Guidelines for the Perpetration of a 1967/1968 Budget for the Civil Administration', 5 November 1967, IDFA 224-51/1985; 'Transcript of the Ministerial Committee for Economic Affairs', 14 May 1968, ISA-PMO-MinisterialCommittees-000icd5 (G-10346/3), p.6.
39. 'Emigration from the Administrated Territories', 16 November 1968, ISA-mfa-Political-000mjqt (HTz-4296/11).
40. 'Transcript of the Knesset Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee Meeting', 9 January 1968, ISA-Knesset-ForeignDefenseCommittee-0013qtm, p.18.
41. Avi Raz, *The Bride and the Dowry*, p. 4; Avi Shlaim, *The Iron Wall*, pp.277–278; Reuven Pedazur, *Nitshon Ha-mevukha: Mediniyut Yisrael Ba-shtahim Le-ahar Milhemet Shesht Ha-yamim* [The triumph of bewilderment: Israel and the territories after the Six Day War] (Tel Aviv: Bitan, 1996), p.73; Aba Eban speech in: 'Transcript of the Security Cabinet', 20 December 1967 ISA-PMO-MinisterialCommitteesSecurity-0013qq9, p.2.
42. 'Letter to Prof. Don Patinkin', 23 July 1967, ISA P-4124/6. For more, see Omri Shafer Raviv, 'Studying an Occupied Society: Social Research, Modernization Theory and the Early Israeli Occupation, 1967–8', *Journal of Contemporary History*, Vol. 55, No. 1 (2020), pp.161–181.

43. 'A meeting on the subject of the refugees with Bachi and Dvoretzky', 6 December 1967, ISA-Privatecollections-YadEshkol-00073xh (A-7921/3).
44. Ibid.
45. Michael Bruno, *Pituah ha-shtahim ha-muhzakim: Bedikat alternativot* [The development of the Administrated Territories: Examining Alternatives] (Jerusalem: The Committee for the Development of the Administered Territories, 1967).
46. 'A meeting on the subject of the refugees with Bachi and Dvoretzky', 6 December 1967, ISA-Privatecollections-YadEshkol-00073xh (A-7921/3).
47. See for example: 'Transcript of the Ministerial Committee of Security Affairs', 20 December 1967, ISA-PMO-MinisterialCommitteesSecurity-0013qq9.
48. 'Transcript of The Knesset Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee Meeting', 23 January 1968, ISA.
49. 'The committee's conclusions regarding 'review on social problems in the Administrated Territories', 17 September 1967, ISA G-6303/4.
50. 'Transcript of the meeting on the matter of Ms. Ada Sereni's Work', 19 February 1968, ISA-Privatecollections-YadEshkol-000626c (A-7921/4).
51. Ibid.
52. 'The weekly meeting with Ada Sereni', 20 March 1968, ISA-Privatecollections-YadEshkol-000626c (A-7921/4).
53. 'A budget for emigration activities', 27 March 1968, ISA-Privatecollections-YadEshkol-000626c (A-7921/4); 'A meeting with Ada Sereni', 27 March 1968, ISA-Privatecollections-YadEshkol-000626c (A-7921/4).
54. Yezid Sayigh, *Armed Struggle and the Search for State* (Washington D.C.: Institute for Palestine Studies, 1997), p.179.
55. 'The meeting with Ada Sereni', 13 May 1968, ISA-Privatecollections-YadEshkol-000626c (A-7921/4).
56. 'Emigration from the Administrated Territories', 16 November 1968, ISA-mfa-Political-000mjqt (HTz-4296/11).
57. Terence Smith, 'Jordanians Bar Gaza Strip Arabs: Refugees are Turned Back for 2nd Consecutive Day', *The New York Times*, 31 July 1968.
58. 'Emigration from the Administrated Territories', 16 November 1968, ISA-mfa-Political-000mjqt (HTz-4296/11).
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60. Ibid, pp.395–396; Ann M. Lesch, 'Prelude to the Uprising in the Gaza Strip, *Journal of Palestine Studies* vol. 20 No.1 (1990), p.3; 'Transcript of the Knesset committee for foreign affairs and security', 13 February 1969, ISA (unmarked source).
61. Ibid; 'Transcript of the Ministerial Committee for the Territories', 25 February 1969, ISA ISA-PMO-MinisterialCommittees-001f6hf (A-7354/3).
62. 'Transcript of the government meeting', 9 February 1969, ISA-PMO-GovernmentMeeting-001197i.
63. 'Transcript of the Ministerial Committee for Economic Affairs', 9 June and 7 July 1968, ISA G-10346.
64. Sara Roy, *The political economy*.
65. This selective emigration paradigm was first introduced by Moshe Dayan in a meeting of the security cabinet on December of 1967. It was implemented in the Gaza Strip only in 1969. See 'Transcript of the Security Cabinet', 27 December 1967 ISA-PMO-MinisterialCommitteesSecurity-0013qq9.
66. 'Transcript of the Ministerial Committee for the Territories', 24 April 1969 ISA-PMO-MinisterialCommittees-001f6he (A-7354/3).
67. Ibid.
68. Ann Lesch, 'Gaza: Forgotten', p.45.
69. 'Transcript of the ministerial committee for the Territories', 24 April 1969, ISA-PMO-MinisterialCommittees-001f6he (A-7354/3).
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74. Lesch, 'Gaza: Forgotten', p.45.
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77. Sara Roy, *The Gaza Strip*, pp.150–151.
78. Shlomi Eldar, 'Israel encourage Gazans to leave', *Al-Monitor*, 21 August 2019; David Israel, 'Israel almost Double Work Permits to Gaza Arabs', *Jewish Press*, 9 July 2019.